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I. INTRODUCTION
Citizens of low-income, resource rich countries have absolutely no voice
in the negotiation or signing of natural resource contracts between their
governments and private investors, even though they are almost always
deeply (and often detrimentally) affected by the terms of the contracts and
resource extraction. To make matters worse, government officials in lowincome, resource rich countries often lack both capacity and experience to
negotiate complex contracts with multinational corporations, which can
ultimately harm both the government and its citizens.1 There is no symmetry
between the negotiating ability of low-income, resource rich countries and
experienced and vastly wealthy multinational corporations. It is notable that
the issues involved go beyond bargaining power, resources and capacity;
there is generally no transparency in either contract negotiations or in
revenues that companies pay to access natural resources. However, this
Article addresses a different aspect of natural resource contracting: the Third
Party Beneficiary Principle and how it can protect the rights of citizens in
third world countries.
When resource extraction harms local communities, those communities are
often without legal remedy.2 Because these citizens did not sign the contract,
1

One commentator suggests:
There is an unavoidable conflict of interest between (usually foreign) naturalresource companies and host countries: The former want to minimize what
they pay, while the latter need to maximize it. Well-designed, competitive,
transparent auctions can generate much more revenue than sweetheart deals.
Contracts, too, should be transparent, and should ensure that if prices soar—
as they have repeatedly—the windfall gain does not go only to the company.
Joseph E. Stiglitz, From Resource Curse to Blessing, PROJ. SYNDICATE (Aug. 6, 2012), http://
www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/from-resource-curse-to-blessing-by-joseph-e--stiglitz.
But see Terutomo Ozawa, A Newer Type of Foreign Investment in Third World Resource
Development, in BRUCE MCKERN, TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE EXPLOITATION OF
NATURAL RESOURCES 111–12 (10th ed. 1993) (claiming that “resource-rich but industrially
undeveloped countries are learning quickly how to bargain for a greater share of benefits from
the operation of foreign investors in extracting natural resources in their countries”).
2
For example, oil extraction in the Niger Delta has contaminated drinking water on
which many local citizens depend, forcing those citizens to eat fish contaminated with oil
and drink polluted water. To make matters worse, the Nigerian government allegedly
denied citizens access to information about how oil extraction would harm them. Oil
industry has brought poverty and pollution to Niger Delta, AMNESTY INT’L (June 30, 2009),
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/news/oil-industry-has-brought-poverty-andpollution-to-niger-delta-20090630. Often, governments do the most damage. Human rights
advocates have coined the term “natural resource curse,” meaning that income from natural
resources in resource-rich countries is often misappropriated by corrupt leaders—for
example, Saddam Hussein used income from Iraq’s natural oil to repress Iraqi citizens.
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they lack privity, and as non-parties to the contract, they consequently lack
contractual remedies. For these reasons, classic contract law—in the absence
of a promise to third parties and consideration from third parties—prohibits
third parties from having standing to sue on that contract or to enforce the
contract.3 Therefore, it is crucial that third party communities in low-income,
resource rich countries are granted third party beneficiary rights, which would
give them the necessary standing to sue on the contract.4
Many recent examples demonstrate the necessity for third party beneficiary
status. One prominent example arose when the Cree Nation of Quebec
objected to a uranium mining project on its territory.5 The investor, Strateco
Resources, sued Quebec, seeking a final decision to permit the project to
proceed.6 When the Cree Nation filed an intervention action seeking to be
joined in the suit with full rights of participation, Strateco Resources objected
on the basis that the Cree were not privy to the negotiations for the approval of
the mining project and therefore could not intervene in the action.7 Cree
Nation Grand Chief Dr. Matthew Coon Come replied, arguing:
[T]he requirement of social acceptability as a condition for
development in Eeyou Istchee is an essential aspect of the
successful nation-to-nation relationship between the Crees and
Quebec. Strateco’s legal action represents a fundamental

Thomas I. Palley, Lifting the Natural Resource Curse, FOREIGN SERV. J. 55 (Dec. 2003),
available at http://www.afsa.org/FSJ/1203/ index.html#/57/zoomed. For a more in-depth
discussion of harms toward citizens, see infra Part III.
3
I will follow up this breakdown of the will theory of contracts by mapping contracting and
its implications in twenty-first century natural resource contracts in a jointly authored piece:
James Gathii & Ibironke Odomosu-Ayanu, The Turn to Contractual Regimes and Contractual
Responsibility in the Extractive Industry, 1 BUS. & HUM. RTS. J. (forthcoming 2015).
4
In advocating for third party beneficiary rights, I do not suggest reducing any of the
rights of investors. To illustrate, I do not advocate that all natural resource contracts between
investors and governments of low-income, resource rich countries contain Calvo clauses—
which require investors to submit to the remedies available in the country with which they
contract, thus forfeiting international remedies. JAMES THUO GATHII, WAR, COMMERCE, AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 157 (Oxford Univ. Press 2010). Rather, I argue that the Third Party
Beneficiary Principle should exist to protect non-parties to contracts who could otherwise not
protect themselves. This Principle does not reduce any investor rights, but instead affords an
extra layer of protection to third world citizens.
5
Henry Lazenby, Quebec First Nations Move to Intervene in Strateco Legal Proceedings,
MINING WKLY. (Feb. 6, 2013), http://www.miningweekly.com/article/quebec-first-nations-mo
ve-to-intervene-in-strateco-legal-proceedings-2013-02-06.
6
Id.
7
Jesse B. Staniforth, Strateco Tries to Sideline Cree Opposition, NATION (Feb. 8, 2013,
8:41 PM), http://www.nationnews.ca/strateco-tries-to-sideline-cree-opposition/.
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challenge to the principle of social acceptability, and to our
treaty rights. We are committed to protecting our environment
and our treaty rights, for current and future generations.8
Notably, unlike in the United States, France, and the United Kingdom,
Canadian contract law does not recognize the Third Party Beneficiary
Principle.9
Another prominent example is the case between residents of Kitui County
in Kenya and Fenxi Mining of China.10 The Mui community raised various
concerns about the impact of the mining project on them and their
environment.11 The citizens claimed that the contract was unfair, in part
because it was signed in a hurry and denied the locals the benefits proposed
in local mining legislation.12 The locals’ representatives made a raft of
recommendations, which were eventually left out of the Benefits Sharing
Agreement that was presumably signed for their benefit.13 Suits against the
government and several petitions in the case were filed, as recently as
February 2014.14 To the extent that the representatives could not sue on the
contract between the government of Kenya and Fenzi Mining of Kenya, this
case demonstrates citizens’ need for third party beneficiary rights.15

8

Crees Move to Intervene in Legal Proceedings Commenced by Strateco Resources, CREE
NATION OF MISTISSINI (Dec. 20, 2013), http://www.mistissini.ca/en/30-new-crees-move-to-in
tervene-in-legal-proceedings-commenced-by-strateco-resources.html.
9
Patrick Macklem, an indigenous rights scholar in Canada, suggests that Canada has had
the most success with third party indigenous claims because the treaty process has forced
recognition of sovereignty for indigenous peoples in Canada. PATRICK MACKLEM,
INDIGENOUS DIFFERENCE AND THE CONSTITUTION OF CANADA (2001).
10
Forgotten in the Scramble for Lamu: A Position Paper on the LAPPSE Project in the
Case of the Aweer and the Fisherfolk, KENYA HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (June 18, 2014,
2:20 PM), http://www.khrc.or.ke/resources/publications/doc_details/69-forgotten-in-the-scram
ble-for-lamua-position-paper-in-the-case-of-the-aweer-and-the-fisherfolk.html.
11
See Musembi Nzengu, Kenya: Mui Coal Mining Case to Be Heard on February 21, STAR
(Feb. 5, 2014), http://allafrica.com/stories/201402050574.html.
12
Musembi Nzengu, Kenya: Mui Coal Deal ‘Unfair,’ STAR (July 14, 2014), http://allafri
ca.com/stories/201407142310.html.
13
Id.
14
Nzengu, supra note 11.
15
Another example that exemplifies the importance of obtaining third party beneficiary status
arose in Turkana this year. For the first time in Turkana’s history, landowners have been offered
to own part of the proposed Lokichar-Lamu oil pipeline in a move aimed at defusing tensions
over compensation for the land taken up by the project. George Omondi, Uhuru Offers Turkana
Land Owners Oil Pipeline Shares in Wayleaves Deal, BUS. DAILY (June 23, 2014), http://www.
businessdailyafrica.com/Uhuru-offers-Turkana-land-owners-oil-pipeline-shares-in-deal/-/53955
2/2359210/-/o6qtrkz/-/index.html.
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This Article proposes recognizing and applying the Third Party
Beneficiary Principle in contracts between low-income, resource rich
countries and natural resource investors. A major impetus for this project is
the increasing recognition of the need to build on the available set of
remedial regimes for violations of human rights by business actors. This
project therefore supplements initiatives put in motion by the U.N. Guiding
Principles on Human Rights to consider human rights risks and to find ways
of addressing them in contract negotiations.16
In both common and civil law countries, third parties have standing to sue
on a contract under certain circumstances. In the United States, the Second
Restatement of Contracts recognizes third party beneficiary standing as a
general principle and specifies certain categories of individuals as having
standing to sue as third party beneficiaries.17 In many jurisdictions, there is a
complex maze of approaches aimed at overcoming the privity doctrine.
Stated most simply, the Third Party Beneficiary Principle is recognized
where a contract is made for the benefit of a third party and allows such third
party a right to enforce the contract by filing suit.18
The Third Party Beneficiary Principle is not intended to circumvent the
will of the parties to a contract, but rather to effectuate the parties’ intentions,
especially where their contract was intended to benefit a third party.19 In
addition, the Third Party Beneficiary Principle exists as a matter of justice
and morality. Thus, third parties such as subsequent tenants or purchasers
are often allowed to sue an engineer or a contractor for the performance of
defective works or the failure to exercise due care and skill in construction

16

Special Rep. of the U.N. Secretary General, Principles for Responsible Contracts:
Integrating the Management of Human Rights Risks into State-Investor Contract
Negotiations: Guidance for Negotiators, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31/Add.3 (May 25, 2011) (by
John Ruggie), available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/A.HRC.17.31.
Add.3.pdf (Principle 9 contemplates that business should have grievance mechanisms in place
for non-contractual parties affected by a project). This Article argues that one can go beyond
Principle 9, which contemplates only non-judicial (operational level) relief mechanisms.
17
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1981).
18
See Drive Yourself Car Hire (London) Co. v. Strutt, [1953] 1 Q.B. 250, 272 (explaining
that it was settled law for at least two hundred years prior to 1861 that a third party could
enforce a contract that it was not a party to if it was made expressly for his benefit).
19
This may be more difficult to prove in the context of a government contract than it would
be in the context of a commercial contract. One scholar notes that the third party must show
that the terms of the government contract must “directly provide for liability to the third
party,” and that it is “not enough for a third party to show that the purpose of the government
contract was to benefit the public.” Wendy Netter Epstein, Contract Theory and the Failures
of Public-Private Contracting, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2211, 2256 (2013) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 313 (1981)).
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contracts.20 The remedies available in a suit by a third party beneficiary are
contractual performance or damages for non-performance, specific
performance or injunctive relief—the same remedies available upon breach
to parties to a contract. In other words, third party beneficiaries have a cause
of action for breach.
The recognition of third party beneficiary rights would supplement
existing approaches to resolving problems in extractive industry operations,
including contract and revenue transparency, codes of conduct, and the U.N.
Norms on Business and Human Rights. A major weakness of these
approaches is that they are not legally enforceable, because voluntary and
non-binding approaches do not give rise to enforceable legal claims. This in
turn reduces their transformative potential for those that suffer the
unfortunate consequences of resource extraction and therefore would benefit
most from having this principle.
In my view, adding Third Party Beneficiary law to existing approaches to
resolving extractive industries problems would be an important supplement to
the available toolkit. The Third Party Beneficiary Principle has the potential to
tilt the incentives for investors and governments to pay more attention to
vulnerable communities and peoples in resource extraction scenarios because
contracts—unlike voluntary and non-binding codes—create enforceable
obligations at the front-end. In fact, as I have argued elsewhere, the absence of
a binding legal regime for accountability in the violent extraction of mineral
resources is facilitated by weak states lacking effective control over their
territory and by the extremely lucrative trading of natural resources.21
My argument is premised on rejecting the compartmentalization of public
and private law in addressing resource extraction problems. By that I mean
that the current framework for addressing problems, or externalities as
economists would call them, that arise from private law dealings—such as
contract law—are thought to be primarily resolved through public rather than
private law. Thus, we see that many of the responses to the resource
extraction problem are conceived in the public law arena, such as the
“Ruggie Framework,”22 or in non-binding corporate codes of conduct.
20
MICHAEL SAYERS, THE LAW COMMISSION, PRIVITY OF CONTRACT: CONTRACTS FOR THE
BENEFIT OF THIRD PARTIES 16 (1996), available at http://lawcommission.Justice.gov.uk/docs/
lc242_privity_of_contract_for_the_benefit_of_third_parties.pdf (last visited July 25, 2014)
[hereinafter LAW COMMISSION REPORT].
21
GATHII, supra note 4, at 237–42.
22
See generally U.N. Human Rights Office of the High Comm’r, Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and
Remedy” Framework, HR/PUB/11/04 (2011), available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/
Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf [hereinafter Ruggie Framework].
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These are all important ways of addressing the resource extraction
problem. However, private law approaches, like the Third Party Beneficiary
Principle, would powerfully complement these current approaches. The
Third Party Beneficiary Principle would be one of the background rules
against which contracts for negotiation of extractive resources would be
conducted. As a result, even if beneficiary communities were unable to
pursue remedies in court, the recognition of the Third Party Beneficiary
Principle would likely influence the negotiation of contracts by requiring the
parties to take into account the rights and interests of local communities who
reside in communities where resources are extracted.23
The importance of adding the Third Party Beneficiary Principle is that the
resource extraction problem arises from the contractual relations between lowincome, resource-rich countries and multinational corporations. Given that
these contracts lay down the foundation upon which natural resource
extraction proceeds,24 it is important to examine contractual remedies to the
resource extraction problem. The need for contractual remedies is further
underlined by how in some low-income, resource-rich countries. Resources
are exploited for the private benefit of a small class of powerful actors,
including corrupt politicians and foreign investors. In my view, the Third
Party Beneficiary Principle is a critical step towards strengthening
accountability within the extremely weak framework of economic actors in
resource extraction.25 To the extent public international law has been unable to
offer binding and enforceable rules to hold economic actors like corporations
accountable for their conduct in the resource extraction context, it is important

23

Epstein, supra note 19, at 2257–58. Professor Epstein suggests that companies would
bid more accurately and would perform better if these rules were adopted. Though Professor
Epstein argues that this result cannot be achieved unless there is a mandatory duty to act in the
public interest, I believe that granting third party beneficiary rights to these citizens would
achieve the same results.
24
There are of course examples of extraction of natural resources that are not conducted
through contractual relationships in many war torn countries.
25
M. Sornarajah, Linking State Responsibility for Certain Harms Caused by Corporate
Nationals Abroad to Civil Recourse in the Legal Systems of Home States, in TORTURE AS
TORT: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LITIGATION 502 (Craig Scott ed. 2001). Sornarajah further argues that:
[A] developing state should be able to assert its rights of protection of its
nationals when an alien causes damage in its state and its nationals are not
provided relief in the home state of the alien in which his assets are situated
and to which he has repatriated profits of his operations in the host state.
Id. at 497.
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to resort to private law remedies such as the Third Party Beneficiary
Principle.26
II. CURRENT EFFORTS AT ADDRESSING EXTRACTIVE RESOURCES
Currently, there are two major approaches aimed at addressing extraction
resources.27 One approach involves voluntary or non-binding codes of
conduct. Another approach requires using a variety of home state and
international regulations. The first approach uses voluntary or non-binding
codes of conduct. One of the oldest examples was a draft Code of Conduct
for Transnational Corporations under the U.N. Center on Transnational
Corporations.28 There are numerous examples of such voluntary codes,
including such multi-stake holder initiatives as the Kimberley Transparency
Initiative,29 the 2002 Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative,30 the U.N.
Global Compact,31 the 2003 U.N. Norms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations, and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to
Human Rights.32 There are also industry specific and company specific
codes.33 The overwhelming majority of these codes were developed without
26
I do not foreclose the possibility of re-orienting private international law in the direction
of human rights as Upendra Baxi strongly argues we should. See UPENDRA BAXI, MASS
TORTS, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE LIABILITY AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, 276
RECUEIL DES COURS 307 (1999).
27
Here I simplify a rather broad area by emphasizing the distinction between legally
binding and non-legally binding approaches. For a good overview of another typology, see
Oliver De Schutter, The Accountability of Multinationals for Human Rights Violations in
European Law (Ctr. for Human Rights and Global Justice, Working Paper No. 1, 2004).
28
See Draft United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, 23 I.L.M 626
(1984).
29
See About: Kimberly Process, KIMBERLY PROCESS, http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/
en/about (last visited Oct. 7, 2014).
30
See History of EITI, EXTRACTIVE INDUS. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, http://eiti.org/eiti/
history (last visited July 31, 2014).
31
Overview of the UN Global Compact, U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT, http://www.unglobal
compact.org/AboutTheGC/index.html (last updated Apr. 22, 2013) (the U.N. encourages its
vendors to participate in the Global Compact).
32
Comm. on Human Rights, Sub-Comm. on the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, Aug. 13, 2003, U.N. ESCOR, 55th Sess., U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2013), available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/sea
rch/view_doc.asp?symbol=E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2.
33
See, e.g., Business Code of Ethics, COCA-COLA (Jan. 2012), http://www.coca-colafemsa.
com/femsa/web/arquivos/KOF%20Business%20Code%20of%20Ethics%202012.pdf; The Way
We Work: Our Global Code of Business Conduct, RIO TINTO (Dec. 2009), http://www.riotinto.
com/documents/The_way_we_work.pdf; Worldwide Code of Conduct, PEPSICO, http://www.pep
sico.com/Download/CodeOfConduct/English_09.pdf (last updated Nov. 2008); Code of Business
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consultations with the local communities that suffer the adverse
consequences of extractive industry activities.34
Another approach has involved a variety of home state regulations—these
are regulatory approaches taken by the States where companies that have
engaged in extractive industries overseas are incorporated. This approach has
included using favorable laws to bring suit against extractive companies for
violation of human rights, environmental and other laws in their home
countries.35 For example, Canada enacted a code of conduct for its
multinational corporations operating in the mining industry and opened an
office to monitor and enforce the code.36 The U.S. has enacted a corporate
disclosure law that requires companies to disclose any payments to a foreign
government for oil, gas or mineral resource extraction in countries like the
Democratic Republic of Congo in their annual reports.37 This law was
successfully challenged in a federal court.38 Efforts to enact a similar
disclosure forcing law in Australia failed. In June 2011, the U.N. Human
Rights Council adopted the “protect, respect and remedy” framework of the
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights that require states to protect
human rights, companies to respect human rights and to offer an opportunity to

Conduct, NESTLÉ (2008), http://www.nestle.com/asset-library/Documents/Library/Documents/C
orporate_Governance/Code_of_Business_Conduct_EN.pdf; Code of Conduct, TOTAL, http://
www.total.com/sites/default/files/atoms/file/total-2011-code-of-conduct-en (last visited July 25,
2014).
34
Ibironke T Odumosu-Ayanu, Governments, Investors and Local Communities: Analysis
of a Multi-Actor Investment Contract Framework, 15 MELB. J. INT’L L. 1, 4 (2014) (discussing
multi-actor contracts as agreements among local communities hosting or impacted by a
particular investment project and outlining a conceptual framework for an alternative means
of ordering in the foreign investment regime).
35
See, e.g., TORTURE AS TORT: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF
TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION (Craig Scott ed., 2001) (containing essays on the
topic).
36
Building the Canadian Advantage: A Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Strategy for
the Canadian International Extractive Sector, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TRADE AND DEV. CANADA
(Mar. 2009), available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciau
x/topics-domaines/other-autre/csr-strat-rse-2009.aspx?lang=eng; see also Building the Canadian
Advantage—Ottawa’s Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility, CAN. BUS. ETHICS RES.
NETWORK (Jan. 4, 2013), http://cbernblog.ca/2013/01/building-the-canadian-advantage-ottawasapproach-to-corporate-social-responsibility/ (describing that Canada released a report that
“outlined a four-tier approach to ensure that Canadian companies would become the most
competitive in international markets based on their ability ‘manage social and environmental
risks’ ”).
37
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010).
38
Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. S.E.C., 748 F.3d 359, 376 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
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bring grievances and have complaints remedied.39 These principles have
received favorable reception in the business community. This research project
will therefore take into account these Guiding Principles.
III. THE THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY PRINCIPLE
A. Introduction to Third Party Beneficiary Principle
Under classic contract law, a contract only creates rights for and is
binding on the parties to the contract.40 Classic contract law tended either to
deny the right of a third party beneficiary to enforce a contract, or, at best, to
allow enforcement only by third parties who fell within specific, welldefined, and standardized categories—most prominently, third parties to
whom the promise owed a preexisting legal obligation.41 Courts under the
influence of classic contract law applied the doctrines of consideration and
privity to object to enforcement by third parties without attempting to
provide a social underpinning for that result.42 In short, parties must be in
privity with one another in order to bring suit on a contract.43 This is known
as the privity of contract doctrine.44 Privity of contract requires that a party
bringing suit based on a contract have something to do with the contract such
as being the promisee or having some other legal interest in the contract.45
The privity of contract doctrine is often invoked to preclude expanding the
liability of the promisor of a contract.46
However, die-hard adherents of classic contract law doctrine47 and many
countries around the world are beginning to recognize that a contract can
bestow rights on a third party.48 Further, as Professor Melvin Eisenberg
39

See Ruggie Framework, supra note 22.
Second Meeting of the Contact Group for the Drafting of the Standard Material Transfer
Agreement, Alnarp, Sweden, April 24–28, 2006, Third Party Beneficiary, Including in the
Context of Arbitration, ¶ 10, CGRFA/IC/CG-SMTA-2/06/Inf.4 (Apr. 2006) [hereinafter U.N.
Third Party Beneficiary].
41
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Third Party Beneficiaries, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1358, 1372–73
(1992).
42
Id. at 1370.
43
See, e.g., Vrooman v. Turner, 69 N.Y. 280, 284 (1877) (“A mere stranger cannot
intervene, and claim by action the benefit of a contract between other parties.”).
44
U.N. Third Party Beneficiary, supra note 40, ¶ 10.
45
Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268, 275 (1859) (Comstock, J., dissenting).
46
Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 1365.
47
SAMUEL WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, § 354, at 683 (1920).
48
U.N. Third Party Beneficiary, supra note 40, ¶ 11; see LAW COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 20, at 1; Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act, 1999, c. 31 (UK) [hereinafter C(RTP) Act
40
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argues, there are “strong social reasons” why at least some third party
beneficiaries should be allowed to sue on a contract to which he or she is not
privy.49 Contracts of this sort are referred to as “third party beneficiary”
contracts.
Here, the beneficiary is classified as either a “creditor
50
beneficiary” or a “donee beneficiary.”51 The third party beneficiary
principle, allows a third person, “in his or her own right and name,”52 to
“enforce a promise made for his or her benefit even though such person is a
stranger both to the contract and to the consideration.”53
There are two steps required to determine whether an enforceable third
party contract exists.54 First, the prerequisites of a third party beneficiary
contract must be analyzed, applied, and met; and second, the “varying classes
of cases in which a third party has, or may have, an interest in the agreement
between two or more parties must be analyzed and differentiated.”55
In order to be a third party beneficiary, the claiming party must show that
the contract was entered into by the parties primarily for his or her own
benefit.56 If it is not clear that the contract was entered into for the benefit of

1999]; see also UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2004, available at
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/blackletter2004.pdf.
49
Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 1370.
50
Id. at 1374.
51
Id. at 1371. A creditor beneficiary is created when a party owes a legal obligation to a
third party prior to a contract being made. See id. The contract is mostly entered into between
the contracting parties so that the party that owes the third party the legal duty will be
discharged of that duty and the other contracting party promises to perform on behalf of the
original promisee. Id. For example, prior to the contract A owes B a sum of money, A enters
into a contract with C to pay off A’s debt to B. B is the creditor beneficiary. A donee
beneficiary of a contract is a third-party to whom the promised beneficial performance comes
without cost as a donation or a gift. See 9 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 42.1,
at 10 (John E. Murray & Joseph M. Perillo eds., rev. ed. 2007).
52
17A AM. JUR. 2D CONTRACTS § 425.
53
SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 37:1, at 9 (Richard A.
Lord ed., 4th ed. 2000).
54
Id. § 37.1, at 16.
55
Id.
56
Goossen v. Estate of Standaert, 525 N.W.2d 314, 319 (Ct. App. 1994); see also JOHN
COSGROVE MCBRIDE & THOMAS J. TOUHEY, 8-49 GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS: LAW, ADMIN. &
PROC. § 49.140 (Walter A.I. Wilson ed.). For example, in Peter Kiewit & Sons’ Co. v. Iowa S.
Utilities Corp, a contract between an engineering firm and a public utility to construct a power
plant made no mention by name of the ultimate general construction contractor, and contained
no expression of any intent to benefit the general contractor. The court held that the general
contractor had no standing to sue the engineering firm or the utility for an alleged breach by
the engineering firm. 355 F. Supp. 376 (S.D. Iowa 1973).
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a third person, then he or she is merely an incidental beneficiary and cannot
recover for a breach of contract.57
Under the Third Party Beneficiary Principle, a contract between A and B
for C’s benefit gives C standing to sue on such a contract. A third party
beneficiary contract arises when a promisor agrees with a promisee that a third
party will receive the performance of the contract.58 Depending on the
jurisdiction, the third party beneficiary principle either eliminates the need for
privity or asserts that privity exists, by virtue of the party’s status as a third
party beneficiary.59 Because there is uncertainty and unevenness about the
enforcement of third party beneficiary rights, where the third party beneficiary
is introduced, it is preferable that a choice of law provision be incorporated to
reflect the general understanding of the availability of third party rights.60
B. The Evolution of Recognizing Third Party Beneficiary Rights
The origins of third party beneficiary rights can be traced to English law
in the 1677 case, Dutton v. Poole.61 Almost a century later, Lord Mansfield
reaffirmed the Third Party Beneficiary Principle in Martyn v. Hind.62 This
tendency to allow third parties to bring suit was followed up to the middle of
57

See Century Nat’l Bank v. Makkar, 751 A.2d 1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000).
WILLISTON, supra note 53, § 37.1, at 12.
59
Id. at 12–13.
60
See U.N. Third Party Beneficiary, supra note 40, ¶ 15. For example, in a contract the
negotiating parties could include a clause that references the UNIDROIT principles of
International Commercial Contracts 2004. Id. Such clause could read “general principles of
law as reflected in the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts shall be
incorporated . . . .” Id.
61
Dutton v. Pool, (1678) 86 Eng. Rep. 215 (K.B.); see also Gary L. Monserud, Blending the
Law of Sales with the Common Law of Third Party Beneficiaries, 39 DUQ. L. REV. 111, 114
(2000). Dutton arose from a family dispute in which a father intended to cut and sell wood in
order to raise a dowry for his daughter. Id. The eldest son that was set to inherit the wood
objected to his father’s intentions and he promised that he would pay his sister a set amount if his
father agreed not to sell the wood. Id. When the eldest son’s sister was married and his father
had died, he refused to pay his sister what he had originally promised his father. Id. The sister
sued and sought to enforce the promise her brother’s promise that was made to her father. Id.
The court held that a suit that was based on a promise was not restricted to the person to which
the promise was made, but the third party intended to benefit from the promise was allowed to
sue in her own name. Id. But see Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 1361. The decision of the court
was ambiguous because the Chief Justice decided that, the third party should be able to recover
due to the close relationship between the father and child. He suggested that a promise made to
the father, could very well be construed as a promise to the daughter.
62
98 Eng. Rep. 1174 (K.B. 1776); see also Monserud, supra note 61, at 114. When talking
about Dutton v. Poole, Lord Mansfield stated, “it is [a] matter of surprise, how a doubt could
have arisen in that case.” 98 Eng. Rep. at 1177.
58
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the nineteenth century in Tweedle v. Atkinson,63 which reaffirmed the
“privity of contract” doctrine and reversed Dutton’s recognition of third
party beneficiary rights.64 In Tweedle, Judge Crompton said, “[it] would be a
monstrous proposition to say that a person was a party for the purpose of
suing upon [a contract] for his own advantage, and not a party to it for the
purpose of being sued.”65 Thus, third party rights fell out of favor with the
rise of classic contract theory.66
The rise and sudden disappearance of third party rights in England was
echoed in Massachusetts; however, the rise and decline occurred in a shorter
time period.67 Massachusetts followed Dutton and its progeny until at least
the early nineteenth century.68 Case reports in Massachusetts establish that
third party rights were recognized for more than forty years. However in
Mellen v. Whipple,69 the development of third party rights—like in
England—reversed course.70 Mellen reaffirmed Tweddle, reaffirming the
“privity” doctrine.71 Post-Mellen cases did not completely abandon third
party beneficiary rights; courts developed more complex exceptions to the
“privity” doctrine.72 Finally, in 1979, the Supreme Judicial Court in Choate,
Hall & Stewart v. SCA Services, Inc.,73 reversed Mellen, finding that the
“privity” exceptions were becoming too cumbersome.74

63

121 Eng. Rep. 762 (Q.B. 1861); 1 B. & S. 393.
Monserud, supra note 61, at 114.
65
121 Eng. Rep. at 764.
66
Monserud, supra note 61, at 115.
67
Id.
68
See id. The first major case in Massachusetts was Felton v. Dickinson, 10 Mass. 287
(1813). In that case, Felton was a fourteen-year-old boy that was put into the service of
Dickinson, who promised the boy’s father that he would support the boy until he turned
twenty-one, whereby at that time he would either pay the boy $200 or give him a parcel of
land in Vermont, whichever he elected. Id. When the boy turned twenty-one, Dickinson
failed to pay him on his election as promised, the boy sued on the promise made to his father.
Id. He won a judgment at the trial court and the Supreme Judicial Court sustained the
judgment on the basis of Dutton v. Poole. Felton, 10 Mass. at 289.
69
67 Mass. 317 (1854).
70
See Monserud, supra note 61, at 115–16.
71
Mellen, 67 Mass. at 321. The court noted specifically that, “[t]here must be a privity of
contract between the plaintiff and defendant, in order to render the defendant liable to an
action, by the plaintiff, on the contract.” Id.
72
See Monserud, supra note 61, at 117.
73
378 Mass. 535 (1979).
74
See Monserud, supra note 61, at 117. Notably, Monserud observes that during the
Mellen era, other American jurisdictions recognized third party rights on contracts either
through case law or by statute. Id.
64
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The recognition of third party rights was anchored in New York.75 New
York’s 1859 decision, Lawrence v. Fox,76 gradually became the paradigmatic
American case allowing third party recovery for creditor beneficiaries.77
Lawrence v. Fox is celebrated today as a landmark case that established third
party recovery on contracts.78 However, it was not remarkably enlightening
for its time, because at the time, New York permitted third party
beneficiaries to bring suit on a contract to which they were not privy.79
Lawrence’s notoriety arose not out of its holdings, but instead out of the
clarity of its several opinions.80
New York cases continued to reaffirm third party rights. For example,
about half a century later, Seaver v. Ransom81 recreated Dutton’s donee
beneficiary principle.82 New York courts recognized two classifications of
third party beneficiaries.83 Notably, and as discussed later, this two-part
classification was mirrored in the First and Second Restatements of the Law
of Contracts. Even though New York courts regularly recognized third party
rights, the development of this area of law may not have been possible had it

75

See id.
20 N.Y. 268 (1859). In the case, Holly loaned Fox $300. Id. at 269. At the time of the
loan, Holly informed Fox that he owed the same amount of the loan to Lawrence. Id. Fox
promised Holly, but did not directly promise Lawrence, that he would repay Holly’s debt to
Lawrence. Id. at 271. The majority of the Court (6–2 decision) agreed that Lawrence had a
case against Fox. The court noted that:
In this case [Fox], upon ample consideration received from Holly, promised
Holly to pay his debt to [Lawrence]; the consideration received and the
promise to Holly made it as plainly his duty to pay [Lawrence] as if the
money had been remitted to him for that purpose, and as well implied a
promise to do so as if he had been made a trustee of property to be converted
into cash with which to pay.
Id. at 274.
77
See Monserud, supra note 61, at 117–18.
78
See Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 1363.
79
Monserud, supra note 61, at 118.
80
Samuel Williston and other casebook editors were impressed with the clarity of the
opinions; consequently Lawrence v. Fox became a leading case for contracts casebooks.
Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 1363; Monserud, supra note 61, at 118.
81
120 N.E. 639 (N.Y. 1918). Mrs. Beman objected to the will her husband, Judge Beman
had drafted for her because her niece was not accommodated by the will as she had wanted.
Id. She was dying and instead of writing a new will Judge Beman promised that if Mrs.
Bemen would sign her will, he would accommodate for her niece in his will. Id. When Judge
Beman died, his will did not accommodate for Mrs. Beman’s niece as the judge had promised.
Id. at 640. The niece sued the executors of Judge Beman’s estate and the New York Court of
Appeals upheld her right to recover. Id. at 640–42.
82
See Monserud, supra note 61, at 118.
83
Id.
76
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not been for Professors Samuel Williston and Arthur Corbin, and even more
of the legal realists of later years.84
C. The First Restatement of the Law of Contracts
The First Restatement of Contracts initiated the modern law of third party
beneficiaries by pushing aside the doctrinal objections to enforcement by
third parties and by moving from a rule-based body of third party beneficiary
law to a body of law supported by a general principle rooted in social
equity.85 The First Restatement recognized third party rights explicitly in
Section 133.86 As recognized in this section, the traditional analysis
categorizes third parties as donee beneficiaries, creditor beneficiaries, or
incidental beneficiaries.87 The terminology of the First Restatement is based
on terminology from Dutton v. Poole and Lawrence v. Fox.88 The
establishment of a donee beneficiary resulting from the opinion of Dutton v.
Poole was written into subsection (a) of Section 133.89 The creation of a
creditor beneficiary resulting from Lawrence v. Fox was incorporated into
Section 133(b).90 Finally, incidental beneficiaries—third parties that benefit
from performance of the contract but do not have enforceable rights—are
referred to in Section 133(c). Sections 135 and 136 provided that a donee or

84

Id. Williston wrote an article for the Harvard Law Review in 1902 that examined how
third party rights were assessed at the turn of the nineteenth century. Samuel Williston,
Contracts for the Benefit of a Third Person, 15 HARV. L. REV. 767 (1902). The privity of
contracts doctrine was based on the will theory of contracts that was very prevalent before the
twentieth century. As Roscoe Pound noted, American courts began declining to take privity
seriously in the early part of the twentieth century. Roscoe Pound, The Rise of the Will in
Law, 68 HARV. L. REV. 6 (1954). For a full review of importance of legal realism and the
breakdown of classic contract law based on the will theory, see Karl E. Klare, Contracts
Jurisprudence and the First-Year Casebook, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 876 (1979) (reviewing
CHARLES L. KNAPP, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIAL (1976)).
85
See Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 1374–76. Suppose C is an intended beneficiary of a
contract between A and B. A breaches the contract with B to the extent that C suffers from A’s
breach. It is equitable to allow C to bring a suit in order to recover damages to the extent that
he has suffered.
86
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 133 (1932).
87
See CORBIN, supra note 51, § 44.3, at 52.
88
JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 17.1, at 642 (4th
ed. 1998).
89
See supra note 61; RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 133(a) (1932).
90
See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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a creditor beneficiary had legally enforceable rights under a contract, but an
incidental beneficiary did not.91
The First Restatement focuses the classification of beneficiaries on the
purpose of the promise that the promisor made to the promisee.92 As
mentioned above, the three categories of beneficiaries are donee, creditor,
and incidental. The third party is a donee beneficiary if the purpose of the
promisor was to confer a gift on the promisee; a creditor beneficiary if the
purpose of the promisee in obtaining the promise was to discharge a
preexisting legal obligation owed to the beneficiary by the promisee; and an
incidental beneficiary if he will benefit from the performance of the contract,
but does not satisfy the criteria of the other two categories.93 Even though
the First Restatement recognizes third party beneficiary rights, its focus on
the purpose (of the contract) and the surrounding language is confusing and
provides “no guidance [concerning] the critical question of how a court was
to determine whether the relevant purpose was present.”94
To avoid the ambiguity of the terminology in Section 133, many courts
have expressed an “intent to benefit” test.95 This test requires that intent to
benefit a third party be clear.96 The test varied between states; some states
required that intent be clear, while others required it to be express or
definite.97 Therefore, the application of the “intent to benefit” test was
somewhat ambiguous, at least between jurisdictions.
Professor Eisenberg also criticized the “intent to benefit” test because the
term “intent” itself is ambiguous.98 “One of the fundamental disputes
concerning the ‘intent to benefit’ test is whether both the promisor and
promisee must intend to benefit the third party, or whether the promisee’s
91
See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, §§ 135–136 (1932) (implying that third party
beneficiaries do not have enforceable rights).
92
CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 88, § 17.2, at 643.
93
Id.
94
Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 1377.
95
CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 88, § 17.3, at 643.
96
Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 1379.
97
Id. Eisenberg cites several cases that applied the “intent to benefit rule.” Those cases are
Security Mut. Cas. Co. v. Pacura, 402 So. 2d 1266, 1267 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (requiring
that intent to benefit must be “clear”); Donalson v. Coca-Cola Co., 298 S.E.2d 25, 27 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1982) (requiring intent be clear); Khabbaz v. Swartz, 319 N.W.2d 279, 285 (Iowa 1982)
(requiring that intent to benefit must be “express”); Snyder Plumbing & Heating Corp. v.
Purcell, 9 A.D.2d 505, 507 (N.Y. App. Div. 1960) (requiring clear intent); Keel v. Titan
Constr. Corp., 639 P.2d 1228, 1231 (Okla. 1981) (requiring express intent); Kelley Health
Care, Inc. v. Prudential Health Ins. Co. of Am., 309 S.E.2d 305, 307 (Va. 1983) (requiring
definite intent).
98
See Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 1378.
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intention should govern.”99 As illustrated, even the test that courts use to
avoid the ambiguities of the First Restatement is itself riddled with
ambiguities. Even though the First Restatement’s terminology and tests that
recognize third party rights may be confusing and ambiguous, they
nevertheless clarify the scope of third party beneficiary rights that have
become unclear after the First Restatement.100
D. The Second Restatement of the Law of Contracts
The Second Restatement greatly expanded third party rights, recognizing
third party beneficiary rights from Sections 302 to 315.101 However, the
heart of its third party beneficiary recognition is Section 302.102 The Second
Restatement provides that a person is a beneficiary of a contract where a
“recognition of a right to performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to
effectuate the intentions of the parties.”103 However, this requirement is
qualified, because there does not need to be such recognition where it is
“otherwise agreed between the promisor and promisee.”104 Thus, the Second
Restatement makes clear that the general common law view is that parties to
a contract may set whatever terms they deem desirable for the effectuation of
their agreement, which the courts must recognize and uphold.105
In some instances, courts establish a distinction between incidental/indirect
beneficiaries and direct beneficiaries. Only direct beneficiaries may be

99

CORBIN, supra note 51, § 44.1, at 46.
See Monserud, supra note 61, at 122 (suggesting that Section 133 and related sections
helped remove the stigma of recognizing third party rights and may have helped to “firmly
root” third party rights in American contract law). Under the First Restatement, it had become
apparent that a number of third party beneficiaries did not fall within the “donee” and
“creditor” categories, such that some courts simply disregarded the categorization approach
and allowed beneficiaries who were neither creditors nor donees to recover. The inflexibility
of the categorization approach led to changes in the Second Restatement of Contracts, under
which intended beneficiaries, who can enforce contracts, are contrasted with incidental
beneficiaries, who cannot. Section 133 of the First Restatement opened the eyes of several
jurisdictions to the rights of third parties. Many took issue with how narrow Section 133 was
and wished to expand it. Section 133 of the First Restatement was therefore the first step in
recognizing third parties as beneficiaries.
101
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302-15 (1981).
102
CORBIN, supra note 51, § 44.4, at 55.
103
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302(1) (1981).
104
Id.
105
See Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
694 P.2d 198, 206 (Ariz. 1984) (“A basic policy of contract law . . . is to preserve freedom of
contract and thus promote the free flow of commerce.”).
100
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recognized as a third party beneficiary.106 However, the determination must
take into account the relevant law and facts.107
E. Modern Application of Third Party Beneficiary Principle in the United
States
Due to the evolution of the common law and the Restatements’
recognition of third party rights, third party rights have been recognized in a
wide variety of legal contexts.108 In the context of government contracts, the
Third Party Beneficiary Principle seems to have been first applied in
Maneely v. United States.109 In Maneely, a decision barring a third party’s
claim where there was no privity was reversed because the third party
benefitted from the transaction.110
In terms of government contracts, when a governmental entity contracts
with a party, the citizens of the governmental entity’s jurisdiction are deemed
to be third party beneficiaries to that contract.111 Courts have held that the
essential element for third party beneficiary status is the intention of the
106

Schuerman v. United States, 30 Fed. Cl. 420, 433 (1994) (“The court carefully must
distinguish between incidental and indirect beneficiaries and direct beneficiaries, only the
latter of which qualifies for third-party beneficiary status.”). In the context of government
contracts, see GECCMC 2005-C1 Plummer St. Office Ltd. P’ship v. JPMorgan Chase Bank,
Nat. Ass’n, 671 F.3d 1027, 1033 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Cnty. of Santa Clara v. Astra USA,
Inc., 588 F.3d 1237, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Parties that benefit from a government contract
are generally assumed to be incidental beneficiaries,” rather than intended beneficiaries, and
so “may not enforce the contract absent a clear intent to the contrary”)).
107
Glass v. United States, 258 F.3d 1349, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2001), amended on reh’g, 273
F.3d 1072 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (stating that whether plaintiff is a third party beneficiary “is a
mixed question of law and fact”).
108
See Joyner v. Vitale, 926 P.2d 1154, 1157 (Alaska 1996) (explaining that, in the context of
a mortgage, when a purchaser assumes a mortgage third party beneficiary law is invoked);
Acoustics v. Hanover Ins. Co., 287 A.2d 482, 485 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1971) (holding that
a subcontractor is a third party beneficiary of a performance bond between the owner, contractor,
and surety); Wilson v. Oliver Costich Co., 247 N.Y.S 131, 134 (App. Div. 1931) (holding that a
non-inhabitant of the political unit in controversy may qualify as a third party beneficiary).
109
68 Ct. Cl. 623 (1929); see also GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS: LAW, ADMIN. & PROC. § 49.10
(2015). In Maneely, the Government entered into a cost-type contract, one provision was, if
the contract was terminated, the contracting officer would assume and become liable for all
unliquidated claims incurred by the contractor. After the plaintiffs supplied the material, the
contract was terminated. The plaintiff filed a claim, but it was disallowed because there was
not privity of contract between the plaintiffs and the Government. The disallowance was
reversed on the third party beneficiary theory.
110
Maneely, 68 Ct. Cl. at 629. Interestingly, Maneely applied a test similar to the “intent to
benefit” test, citing Vrooman v. Turner, 69 N.Y. 280, 283–84 (1877).
111
See Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 1406 (“The courts have tended to give suits by thirdparty beneficiaries under government contracts special or ‘categorical’ treatment.”).
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parties for the contract to benefit the third party.112 Even the Second
Restatement recognizes liability for a party that contracts with a
governmental entity, but only if the contract expressly creates a cause of
action for the third party citizens or where such a suit would be consistent
with the terms of the contract and the policy of law authorizing the
contract.113 Some states, such as New York, do not even require that the
contract expressly create a cause of action for the citizens, allowing a cause
of action to stand where the contract is intended to benefit the individual
citizens of that governmental entity.114
The Third Party Beneficiary Principle has been applied in various other
types of cases, such as construction contract cases involving bonds and
suretyships. One such situation is when an owner of property contracts with
the general contractor and requires the general contractor to put up a
payment bond to ensure payment to any subcontractors. These
subcontractors may be third party beneficiaries to the contract between the
owner and the general contractor.115
While these construction cases do not uniformly allow the subcontractor
to enforce the promise within the contract between the owner and the general
contractor, this disparity in the case law can be attributed to the special
circumstances of the construction relationship because the subcontractor

112

Montana v. United States, 124 F.3d 1269, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (implying a party is a
third-party beneficiary of a contract with the Government if that contract “reflect[s] the
express or implied intention of the parties to benefit the third-party” (quoting Schuerman v.
United States, 30 Fed. Cl. 420, 433 (1994))).
113
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 313(2) (1981).
114
See Pond v. New Rochelle Water Co., 76 N.E. 211, 214 (N.Y. 1906) (holding that the
municipality contracted with the corporation “to protect [the municipality’s] inhabitants,” so those
inhabitants were third party beneficiaries of the contract); Seaver v. Ransom, 224 N.Y. 233, 238
(“The right of the third party is . . . upheld in . . . the public contract cases where the municipality
seeks to protect its inhabitants by covenants for their benefit . . . .” (internal citations omitted)).
115
See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 1397 (“[T]he modern tendency is to allow
subcontractors to recover against the sureties of payment bonds in . . . private . . . cases.”);
Daniel-Morris Co. v. Glens Falls Indem. Co., 126 N.E.2d 750, 752 (N.Y. 1955) (finding that
the primary purpose of the payment-performance bond taken out by the general contractor was
to ensure payment to material men because the underlying contract required the subcontractor
to furnish its work “free of the lien of any third party . . .”); Jacobs Assocs. v. Argonaut Ins.
Co., 580 P.2d 529, 532 (Or. 1978) (finding that a subcontractor could collect payment from a
surety when the general contractor defaulted in payment due to insolvency because “the bond
was for the benefit of unpaid creditors . . .”). But see Fosmire v. Nat’l Surety Co., 127 N.E.
472, 473 (N.Y. 1920) (finding that a laborer could not recover unpaid wages from the surety
under a payment-performance bond required by the Highway Law for a public works contract
because “[t]he dominant purpose of this bond was protection to the state”).
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generally has the right to place a lien on the owner’s property if the general
contractor fails to pay the subcontractor for the work performed.116
F. Evolution of the Third Party Beneficiary Principle Abroad
Like the United States, the United Kingdom and France have begun to
recognize third party beneficiary rights,117 even though their paths to
recognition may have taken indirect routes.118 In the United Kingdom, the
Law Commission recommended the recognition of a third party beneficiary
law in its report of 1996.119 Law Commission Report 242 led to a bill that
was enacted as the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999.120 The
Contracts Act of 1999 allows a third party to enforce contracts that expressly
provide for enforcement by a third party, and also permits the enforcement of
contracts whose terms purport to confer a benefit upon a third party.121
Unless parties explicitly agree otherwise, the Act does not apply to contracts
entered into before May 11, 2000.122 According to the Commission, the
Third Party Beneficiary Principle123 causes “difficulties in commercial
life.”124 For example, in insurance contracts, there are some areas where the
legislature did not intervene “to give third party beneficiaries a right to
enforce the contract against the insurer.”125 The Commission mentioned the
116

See N.Y. LIEN LAW § 3 (McKinney 2013).
See, e.g., James M. Hosking, The Third Party Non-Signatory’s Ability to Compel
International Commercial Arbitration: Doing Justice Without Destroying Consent, 4 PEPP.
DISP. RESOL. L.J. 469, 527 (2004) (“The trend in all three jurisdictions is towards greater
recognition of third party beneficiary rights and application of a test which has at its
touchstone the ‘intention’ of the parties.”).
118
See, e.g., HOWARD O. HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS § 20:4 (2013) (noting that
“[t]he major inroads on the privity doctrine have come from collateral attacks such as actions
premised on unjust enrichment, tort, or the law of trusts”).
119
See LAW COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 20, at 50. The Act came into force on
November 11, 1999.
120
C(RTP) Act 1999, supra note 48.
121
Rizyan Khawar, Reinsurance and Privity in the Past, Present, and Future: Privity of
Contract in Reinsurance and the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act of 1999, 77 TUL. L.
REV. 495, 499 (2002). The intention of the parties is crucial to determine if the third party has
privity of contract. To be considered a third party beneficiary, the third party must be
identified in the contract. The C(RTP) Act of 1999 is very liberal in its determination of what
constitutes identification. A party can be identified by name, as a member of a class, or by
answering a particular description. Id.
122
C(RTP) Act 1999, supra note 48, § 10.
123
See LAW COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 20, at 1 (“[A] contract does not confer rights
on someone who is not a party to the contract.”).
124
Id. at 43.
125
Id. at 48.
117
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situation where an employer can take out medical expenses insurance for its
employees without there being doubts as to whether the employees can
enforce the policy against the insurance company.126
In France, third-party beneficiary rights are not the rule but an exception
to the principle stated in Article 1165 of the French Civil Code. Article 1165
provides that: “Agreements produce effect only between the contracting
parties; they do not harm a third party, and they benefit him only in the case
provided for in Article 1121.”127 This principle that agreements “produce
effect only between the contracting parties”128 is called in French law “effet
relatif du contrat,” literally, the relative effect of a contract. It offers a strict
reading of the privity of contract doctrine. Article 1121 of the French Civil
Code states that:
One may likewise stipulate for the benefit of a third party
[“stipuler au profit d’un tiers”], where it is the condition of a
stipulation which one makes for oneself or of a gift which one
makes to another. He who made that stipulation may no longer
revoke it, where the third party declares that he wishes to take
advantage of it.129
This exception is fairly narrow and limited to those two situations: “the
condition of a stipulation which one makes for oneself or of a gift which one
makes to another.”130 Nonetheless, French courts have adopted a flexible
approach that seems to be closer to the modern reality of contracts.131 The
highest French civil court (the Cour de Cassation) used the concept of group
of contracts to allow for remedies for parties who were not parties the initial
This concept joins contracts that are “mutually linked
contract.132

126

Id. at 48–49.
CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1165 (Fr.), English translation, available at http://www.legifr
ance.gouv.fr/Traductions/en-English/Legifrance-translations.
128
Id.
129
CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1121 (Fr.), English translation, available at http://www.legifran
ce.gouv.fr/Traductions/en-English/Legifrance-translations.
130
Id.
131
See, e.g., Mitchel de S.-O.-l’E. Lasser, Judicial (Self-) Portraits: Judicial Discourse in the
French Legal System, 104 YALE L.J. 1325, 1386–87 (1995) (“It is true that Article 1165 was
better adapted to an individualist civilization than to the social and economic relations of our
time, and that it becomes more and more difficult to consider contracts in an isolated fashion.”).
132
Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] lère civ., June 21 1988,
Bull. Civ. I, No. 85-12.609 (Fr.) 5, note C. Larroumet, comments of P. Jourdain, Rev. trim. dr.
civil 1988, 762 and Ph. Remy, eod.loc. 1989, 107.
127
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contracts.”133 However, the mechanism of Article 1121 of “stipulation pour
autrui” (third party beneficiary contract) still necessarily implies some sort
of relationship between the stipulator and the beneficiary.
IV. BASIS OF THIRD PARTY LEGAL INTERESTS IN RESOURCE CONTRACTS
In this Part of the Article, I advance four reasons why the Third Party
Beneficiary Rule applies to resource extraction contracts. The first and most
important one is that third party beneficiary status is consistent with the
wishes of the promisee and promisor in resource contracts and second that
resource contracts are made for the benefit of the public. Third, I argue in
favor of the principle on grounds of justice and morality, and fourth on
public policy grounds.
A. Consistency Between Wishes of Contracting Parties and Third Party
Beneficiaries
Third party beneficiary status is consistent with the promises made
between contracting parties in resource extraction contracts.134 In other
words, allowing third parties to sue is necessary to effectuate the intentions
of the parties to the contract. Thus, the ability to sue on the part of a third
party here is remedial, rather than substantive.135 It is remedial because the
third party would be seeking to enforce the promises made between the
contracting parties. Here, standing for the third party would not necessarily
depend on proving that the contracting parties intended to benefit the third
party. However, it is beyond doubt as this section will show, that natural
resource contracts are intended for the benefit of the nationals and local
peoples of the country where the resources are located.
Although governments contract with investors as if natural resource
extraction agreements are private contracts, they aim at producing public
benefits and their proceeds are intended to benefit the public. In many legal
systems around the world, mineral resources and other resources such as
water and lands are vested in States, however, the rights of the States to use

133
Denis Tallon, The Principle of the Relative Effect of Contracts and the Theory of Groups
of Contracts: Towards A New Reading of Article 1165 of the French Civil Code?, 6/7 TUL.
CIV. L.F. 95, 97 (1991–1992).
134
See Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 1386.
135
Id.
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and dispose of these resources is understood to be limited if it would cause a
substantial impairment to the interests of the public in such resources.136
This principle is further reflected in many national Constitutions, which
treat natural resources, not as market goods, but as public goods in which the
national population has a direct interest. The Egyptian Constitution, for
example, declares that natural resources “belong to the people,” and that the
people are “entitled to their revenues.”137 The Constitution further provides
that the Egyptian state “is committed to preserving such resources for future
generations and putting them to good use.”138 The Ghanaian Constitution
similarly vests all minerals on its territory, lakes, territorial sea, and
continental shelf “in the President on behalf of, and in trust for the people of
Ghana.”139 The Iraqi Constitution provides that “oil and gas are owned by all
the people of Iraq in all the regions and governates.”140 The 2010 Kenyan
Constitution provides in part that its citizens have a right to “secure
ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources while
promoting economic and social development.”141 In short, governments
globally argue they need private investors, because private investors supply
136

For example, in the United States, the public trust doctrine limits government’s use of land.
In Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892), the Supreme Court held that though the
state may own certain public land (Lake Michigan), its title to that land was different from lands
intended for sale; it was “a title held in trust for the people of the state that they may enjoy the
navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed
from the obstruction or interference of private parties.” Id. at 452. In 1970, Professor Joseph
Sax argued that the public trust doctrine applies also to environmental issues. Danielle Spiegel,
Note, Can The Public Trust Doctrine Save Western Groundwater?, 18 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 412,
429 (2010) (citing Joseph Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 556 (1970)). Even the Supreme Court has held that
states should not have complete control over their natural resources. In Pennsylvania v. West
Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923), the Supreme Court noted that if states could control their natural
resources, “a singular situation might result: Pennsylvania might keep its coal, the Northwest its
timber, and the mining states their minerals.” Id. at 599.
Since the 1970s, the public trust doctrine has been adopted in nations across the world.
For example, the Supreme Court of India held:
Our legal system—based on English common law—includes the public trust
doctrine as part of its jurisprudence. The state is the trustee of all natural
resources which are by nature meant for public use and enjoyment. Public at
large is the beneficiary of the sea-short, running waters, airs, forests and
ecologically fragile lands. The state as a trustee is under a legal duty to
protect the natural resources.
M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, (1997) 1 S.C.C. 388, 388 (India).
137
CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, Sept. 11, 1971, art.18.
138
Id.
139
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA, art. 257(6).
140
DOUSTOUR JOUMHOURIAT AL-IRAQ [CONSTITUTION], 2005, art. 111 (Iraq).
141
CONSTITUTION, 2010, art. 30 (Kenya).
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skills and technology to extract the natural resources that the governments
own on behalf of their people.
Investors also come with financial resources to pay for the extraction of
natural resources that governments argue they need to extract to benefit the
public. These financial resources are in turn applied towards public projects,
such as roads, or for paying for public education and health. According to the
African Natural Resources Center of the African Development Bank, African
countries have about 30% of the world’s known reserves of minerals; about
8%–10% of gas resources; and the largest reserves of cobalt, diamonds,
platinum, and uranium.142 Ideally, investors would be able to turn these
resources into income for the citizens of African countries, fostering economic
growth and fortitude while benefiting their shareholders with higher profit.
In an attempt to ensure these benefits inure to governments with extractive
resources the private sector created the Extractive Industry Transparency
Initiative.143 This global coalition is predicated on the view that the wealth
generated from natural resources should be “an important engine for
sustainable economic growth” that results in poverty reduction and that such
wealth should be used in the interest of national development.144 This and
similar initiatives recognize the use of natural resources to benefit the
populations in the countries where extraction happens.
Another group that has attempted to protect the interests of local
communities is the World Bank. The World Bank, one of the largest lenders of
development finance to countries with large mineral deposits, established the
World Bank Inspection Panel in 1993.145 The purpose of the Inspection Panel is
to give people affected by World Bank-funded projects the right to bring to the
Bank’s attention for corrective action adverse social and environmental impacts
of Bank financed projects.146 The Inspection Panel undertakes this mandate by
examining those social and economic impacts and ensuring the Bank follows
appropriate operation policies and procedures.147 There are safeguards among
the Bank’s operational policies and procedures to protect the environment,
142
Africa’s Natural Resources: A Snap Shot, AFRICAN NATURAL RES. CTR., available at
http://www.afdb.org/en/topics-and-sectors/initiatives-partnerships/african-natural-resources-ce
nter-anrc/ (last visited May 19, 2015).
143
The EITI Principles, EXTRACTIVE INDUS. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, http://eiti.org/eiti/
principles (last visited July 31, 2014); EITI Countries, EXTRACTIVE INDUS. TRANSPARENCY
INITIATIVE, http://eiti.org/countries (last visited July 31, 2014).
144
The EITI Principles, supra note 143, ¶¶ 1–2.
145
The Inspection Panel, WORLD BANK, http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/Pages/Abo
utUs.aspx (last visited Aug. 3, 2014).
146
Id.
147
Id.
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including forests, as well as indigenous peoples and their cultural resources.148
Noncompliance can lead to dire results. For example, the World Bank withdrew
support of the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline project as a result of non-observance of
its operational policies and procedures.149
B. Resource Development Should Benefit Local Citizens
Among the most basic and universal principles of resource development
is that it “should secure the greatest benefit for citizens.”150 In many lowincome, resource-rich countries, natural resources form a substantial part of
the wealth of the country.151 Many of these countries depend on these
resources to earn revenue to support their national budgetary needs to finance
education, health, food, water, and other essential programs. The revenue
from these resources is also the only reliable source of funding for long-term
investments like infrastructure.152 Therefore, development in general,
including resource extraction, should be done primarily to benefit the
people.153 However, there is often a divergence between theory and practice

148

Id.
World Bank Pulls Out of Chad-Cameroon Oil Pipeline Project, ECON. TIMES (Sept. 10,
2008, 5:44 AM), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2008-09-10/news/27732853_1
_chad-cameroon-chadian-government-pipeline-project.
150
The Twelve Precepts, NAT. RESOURCE CHARTER, http://naturalresourcecharter.org/precepts
(last visited Aug. 3, 2014). Indeed, in August 2014, the South African Development Community
(SADC) will hold its annual summit in Zimbabwe, where it will focus on methods by which
African countries can maximize the benefits of their natural resources. Sean Woolfrey,
Beneficiation in SADC, TRALAC (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.tralac.org/discussions/article/60
46-beneficiation-in-sadc.html?utm_source=Weekly+tralac+Newsletter&utm_campaign=3ba006
fd0d-NL20140813&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_a95cb1d7ad-3ba006fd0d-269805525.
This summit will follow efforts by many African nations to benefit local economies. Id. For
example, in 2012, South Africa adopted a “Beneficiation Strategy” to promote industrialization.
Id. Botswana has taken steps to process locally mined diamonds. Id. Further, Zambia has raised
taxes on mining companies and has introduced a “windfall tax” for high profits. Id.
151
See infra Figure 1 (conveying that the percentage of natural capital in the wealth of lowincome countries is greater than in middle and high-income countries).
152
Naazneen H. Barma, Kai Kaiser, Tuan Minh Le & Lorena Vinuela, Rents to Riches? The
Political Economy of Natural Resource-Led Development, WORLD BANK 78 (2012), available
at https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/2381/659570PUB0EPI1073
7B0Rents0to0Riches.pdf?sequence=1.
153
Professor Epstein notes that typically, the terms of the contract must directly provide for
liability to the third party; this heightened standard is justified by the fact that these contracts
are made to benefit third parties. Epstein, supra note 19, at 2256–57. So, the intended benefit
to third parties ends up reducing their ability to sue. Id. at 2257. Based on the fact that
citizens are often harmed by resource extraction contracts, this fact seems a bit ironic.
149
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as evidenced by many examples of situations where citizens of countries rich
in natural resources are deprived of their benefits.154
Despite these problems with resource contracts, many groups have
instituted policies to help citizens in resource contract situations. The U.N.
formally recognized that resource contracts should benefit citizens in its
1986 Declaration on the Right to Development.155 This Declaration provides
that “the human person is the central subject of the development process and
that development policy should therefore make the human being the main
participant and beneficiary of development.”156 Further, the Declaration
makes the right to development “an inalienable human right,” which implies
that citizens have the right to “full sovereignty over all their natural wealth
and resources.”157 In addition, the Declaration puts the onus on States,
giving them the “duty to formulate appropriate national development
policies” that aim to improve the well-being of the entire population,
resulting in the “fair distribution of [development] benefits.”158
The importance and recognition of the right to development is reflected in
subsequent U.N. resolutions, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights, discussed below, and the U.N. Millennium Declaration.159 The
154

Though these agreements should be made to benefit the citizens of resource-rich nations,
the reality is that income generated from these agreements often falls into the hands of the
affluent parties who trade these resources. Thomas W. Pogge, Eradicating Systemic Poverty:
Brief for a Global Resources Dividend, 2 J. HUMAN DEV. 59, 64 (2001). Pogge notes, “[t]he
global poor get to share the burdens resulting from the degradation of our natural environment
while having to watch helplessly as the affluent distribute the planet’s abundant natural wealth
amongst themselves.” Id. Additionally, foreign investors have engaged in practices that,
while purporting to help local communities, actually harm those communities. For example,
the practice of “land grabs”—purchasing enormous amounts of land for farming—is said to
benefit local communities. Steve Baragona, UN: ‘Land Grab’ Deals Hurt Local Farmers,
VOICE OF AM. NEWS (Dec. 7, 2012, 1:08 PM), http://www.voanews.com/content/un-reportland-grab-deals-hurt-locals/1560599.html. However, in Ethiopia, foreign companies have
spent over $2 billion leasing over 225,000 hectares of land for farming, but the harvests are
exported back to the investors’ home countries. Id. Thus, fertile land that could produce food
for local communities is instead used to supply food to already wealthy countries. Id. In
countries like Ethiopia that already face severe food shortages, this practice is extremely
detrimental. Id. To make matters worse, local communities allege that money that should
have gone to the communities has instead fallen into the pockets of corrupt governments. Id.
155
Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/128
(Dec. 4, 1986).
156
Id.
157
Id. art. 1.
158
Id. art. 2(3).
159
James Thuo Gathii, The Cotonou Agreement and Economic Partnership Agreements, in
U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R, REALIZING THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT
259, 260 (2013).
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Millennium Declaration, adopted during the Millennium Summit in
September 2000,160 makes clear that the right to development, including
through resource extraction, should be a “reality for everyone” and that
globalization should be “a positive force for all the world’s people.”161
Borne out of the Millennium Declaration were the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs), a set of eight goals162 aimed at addressing the
ideals set forth in the Millennium Declaration.163 The adoption of the MDGs
further underscores that States accept the responsibilities and obligations set
out in the Declaration on the Right to Development.164 In addition, the fact
that the MDGs are specifically intended to benefit the people is reflected by
the commitments made to “reduce poverty and hunger, to tackle ill health,
gender inequality, lack of education, lack of access to clean water, and
environmental degradation.”165
In order to reach the MDGs and achieve the benefits sought, several
international initiatives are centered on achieving these goals. Then
Secretary General of the U.N., Kofi Annan, sanctioned the U.N. Millennium
Project to help recommend a plan for achieving the MDGs by 2015.166 The
Project was an independent advisory composed of experts in development
and sustainability that was tasked with identifying practical steps to achieve

160

John W. McArthur, Own the Goals: What the Millennium Development Goals Have
Accomplished, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Mar./Apr. 2013, available at http://www.foreignaffairs.
com/articles/138821/john-w-mcarthur/ownthe-goals (noting that the “heads of state accepted
that they needed to work together to assist the world’s poorest people”).
161
United Nations Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, ¶ 5, 11, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/2
(Sept. 18, 2000).
162
Goals, Targets and Indicators, U.N. MILLENNIUM PROJECT, http://www.unmillenniumproject.
org/goals/gti.htm#goal1 (last visited Aug. 5, 2014) (the eight goals are as follows: (1) eradicate
extreme poverty and hunger; (2) achieve universal primary education; (3) promote gender equality
and empower women; (4) reduce child mortality; (5) improve maternal health; (6) combat
HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; (7) ensure environmental sustainability; and (8) forge
global partnerships among different countries and actors to achieve development goals).
163
Jeffrey D. Sachs, Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium
Development Goals, U.N. MILLENNIUM PROJECT 1 (2005), available at http://www.unmillenn
iumproject.org/documents/overviewEngLowRes.pdf (stating that MDGs are the world’s timebound and quantified targets for addressing extreme poverty and basic human rights issues, as
well as promoting gender equality, education, and environmental sustainability).
164
Gathii, supra note 159, at 261.
165
Andy Haines & Andrew Cassels, Can the Millennium Development Goals be Attained?,
BMJ, Aug. 12, 2004, at 394, available at http://www.bmj.com/content/329/7462/394.
166
Q&A on the Millennium Project and its Report, U.N. MILLENNIUM PROJECT, http://www.
unmillenniumproject.org/resources/qa.htm (last visited July 31, 2014).

120

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 43:93

the MDGs in every country.167 The core recommendation of the Project is
that the MDGs should be at the forefront of national and international
poverty reduction strategies.168 Further, that developing countries must
assess where they stand on achieving the MDGs and take the necessary
interventions to meet the 2015 deadline.
Other entities that have played an important role in helping to achieve the
MDGs and further development around the world include civil society
organizations like ActionAid or the International Planned Parenthood
Federation.169 These organizations can raise awareness about the MDGs,
mobilize support among key constituencies to keep pressure on leaders to
follow through on commitments related to the MDGs, and can monitor
progress and maintain transparency in investment, extraction or other
development programs.170
Another such initiative is the Millennium Cities Initiative (MCI), which
was set up in association with the Millennium Project.171 MCI’s focus is on
helping certain sub-Saharan African cities achieve the MGDs.172 MCI’s
prepared report on resource-rich Blantyre, Malawi, found that investment in
mining between 1999 and 2007 accounted for 73% of all foreign direct
investment, and that further investment in mining presents a growing
opportunity for development.173 A similar report on development in the
lower Zambezi basin found that Mozambique could utilize its vast resources
to achieve a major boost to its economic development.174

167
Jeffrey D. Sachs, The Millennium Project: A Plan for Meeting the Millennium
Development Goals, 365 LANCET 347 (2005), available at http://www.thelancet.com/journ
als/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(05)17791-5/fulltext.
168
About the U.N. Millennium Project, U.N. MILLENNIUM PROJECT, http://www.unmillenni
umproject.org/who/index.htm (last visited Aug. 5, 2014) (discussing the project and its goals);
see also Sachs, supra note 163 (giving a more detailed analysis of the Project’s ten
recommendations).
169
Sachs, supra note 163, at 18 (other civil society organizations include Bread for the
World, CIVICUS, DATA, Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN),
Médecins sans Frontières, InterAction, Oxfam, RESULTS International, and Social Watch).
170
Id.
171
Malawi Blantyre, Potential Opportunities for Investment, KPMG 3 (Oct. 2009),
available at http://academiccommons.columbia.ed/cataglo/ac%3A135570.
172
Id.
173
Id. at 13, 43.
174
See Zambazi Valley Development Study, COLUMBIA CTR. ON SUSTAINABLE INV. (June 6,
2011), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/2011/06/26/zambezi-valley-development-study/; see also Lisa
Sachs et al., Resource-Based Sustainable Development in the Lower Zambezi Basin, VALE
COLUMBIA CTR. ON SUSTAINABLE INT’L INV. (June 1, 2001).
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While these are just some examples of international developments and
strategies, it is clear that the right to development, including through resource
extraction, is not only a right that belongs to the people, but is also a right
that should primarily benefit them.

Share of Natural Capital in
Wealth (Percent)
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Low Income

Middle
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World

Figure 1
Governments and investors argue that the development of natural
resources is, not only for the benefit of investors, but also for the greatest
possible benefit of the people in the country where the resources are located.
Resource contracts therefore embody a very important underlying
understanding—that they are an essential link to a country’s development.
Botswana is an excellent example on how best to use natural resources to
facilitate economic growth and development. The following illustration
demonstrates how Botswana has contributed to its national wealth and
economic growth from the mining of its natural resources such as diamonds.
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Figure 2175

175
The Changing Wealth of Nations: Measuring Sustainable Development for the New
Millennium Released, WORLD BANK (Jan. 24, 2011, 9:13 AM), http://data.worldbank.org/
news/the-changing-wealth-of-nations.
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Figure 3176
And, as the figure above demonstrates, there is potential for resource-rich
countries to grow their economies from mineral rents and taxes.
Today, the international legal principle of Permanent Sovereignty Over
Natural Resources is understood not merely as conferring on States the right
to control the use of natural resources within its territory, but also as obliging
states to proactively use those resources for the benefit of their people.177 To

176
Id. In February 2013, one Botswana Pula is of equal value to twelve U.S. Cents—that
means sixteen trillion Pula is of equal value to one billion U.S. Dollars.
177
Kamal Hossain, Introduction to KAMAL HOSSAIN & SUBRATA ROY CHOWDHURY,
PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, at ix–xx
(Kamal Hossain & Subrata Roy Chowdhury eds., 1984); Emeka Duruigbo, Permanent
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illustrate, the Declaration provides in part that “The right of peoples and
nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources
must be exercised in the interest of their national development and the wellbeing of the People of the State concerned.”178 This Declaration does not
create a right to assist citizens—it creates a duty.
Further, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has recognized the
rights of indigenous and non-indigenous groups to the natural resources
within their lands.179 In the 2001 case between Awas Tingni Community and
the government of Nicaragua, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
recognized indigenous peoples’ right to their land and affirmed that all
people—including indigenous people—have the right to the “use and
enjoyment of his property” pursuant to the American Convention on Human
Rights.180 For its part, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights has construed Article 21 of the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights, which gives people the right to dispose of their natural
resources as obliging African governments to protect their citizens from
damaging conduct perpetrated by private actors. In this case, SERAC v.
Nigeria, the Ogoni community of the Niger Delta alleged that the Nigerian
government through its state owned oil company, which was in a consortium
with Shell Petroleum Development Corporation, had exploited oil reserves in
a manner that had degraded the environment, caused short-term and longterm adverse impacts on the people and repressed the protests of the Ogoni
people with violence and execution of their leaders.181 The Commission
found the Nigerian government liable for violating Article 21 (disposition of
natural resources shall be exercised for the exclusive interest of the people);
Article 24 (the right to a general satisfactory environment favorable to the
development of peoples); Article 14 (right to property); Article 18 (failure of

Sovereignty and Peoples’ Ownership of Natural Resources in International Law, 38 GEO.
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 33, 66–67 (2006).
178
Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. res. 1803 (XVII), U.N. Doc.
A/5217 (Dec. 1962); see also Theodore Macdonald, Inter-American Court of Human Rights
Rules in Favor of Nicaraguan Indians, 25.4 CULTURAL SURVIVAL Q., Winter 2001, available
at http://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survival-quarterly/nicaragua/inter-am
erican-court-human-rights-rules-favor-nic.
179
See Lisl Brunner, The Rise of Peoples’ Rights in the Americas: The Saramaka People
Decision of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 7 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 699, 699 (2008).
180
The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations and
Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 145 (Aug. 31, 2001).
181
The Social and Econ. Rights Action Ctr. and the Ctr. for Econ. and Soc. Rights v.
Nigeria, African Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Comm. No. 155/96 of 2001), http://
www1.umn.edu/humanrts/Africa/comcases/155-96.html.
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the state to protect the family as the natural unit and basis of society); Article
4 (right to food); and Article 16 (right to health).182
C. Interests of Justice and Morality
Although natural resources are a major source of the wealth of many lowincome resource-rich countries, such wealth is also highly correlated with the
initiation, duration and persistence of violence.183 This violence has resulted
in huge losses of human lives, property and the quality of lives of those that
survive the violence. Resource rich countries like the Democratic Republic
of Congo and Angola have a weak rule of law system, weak governance
institutions that are bedeviled with corruption. These institutions divert the
wealth from natural resources from the national treasury for private gain.
The mineral wealth of low-income resource rich countries can be used to
finance capital enhancing programs such as infrastructure as well as
important social programs in education, water, food and health as well as to
fund social protection programs for the most vulnerable citizens and to save
some of the income to ensure availability of financing when there is a downswing in commodity prices.
In the foregoing sense, the Third Party Beneficiary Principle in resource
extraction contracts is consistent with the interests of justice and morality.
The underlying assumption here is that it is the just and moral thing for lowincome, resource dependent countries to invest income from their mineral
wealth for the benefit of their current and future generations. Under this

182

Two new cases from the Supreme Court of Canada have articulated a new duty on the
Crown—the constitutional duty to implement the honor of the Crown. The new duty described
by the Supreme Court of Canada in these two cases is described as a duty to consult and
accommodate. The Court stated that the duty is grounded in the honor of the Crown and
emphasized that this principle is always at stake in its dealings with Aboriginal peoples. The
Court held that:
[T]he historical roots of the principle of the honor of the Crown suggest that it
must be understood generously in order to reflect the underlying realities from
which it stems. In all its dealings with Aboriginal peoples, from the assertion of
sovereignty to the resolution of claims and the implementation of treaties, the
Crown must act honorably. Nothing less is required if we are to achieve “the
reconciliation of the pre-existence of Aboriginal societies with the Sovereignty
of the Crown.”
JEAN TEILLET, THE ROLE OF THE NATURAL RESOURCES REGULATORY REGIME IN ABORIGINAL
RIGHTS DISPUTES IN ONTARIO 60 (Mar. 31, 2005) (citing Haida Nation v. British Columbia
(Ministers of Forests), 2004 S.C.C. 73, ¶ 17).
183
PAUL COLLIER, THE BOTTOM BILLION: WHY THE POOREST COUNTRIES ARE FAILING AND
WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT (2007).
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justification, the Third Party Beneficiary Principle arises independently of
the express wishes of the parties to a resource extraction contract.184
Such an approach to the Third Party Beneficiary Principle is
contemplated by Restatement Second of Contracts Section 204, comment d,
which provides that: “[W]here there is in fact no agreement [on a matter that
falls within the ambit of a contract], the courts should supply a term that
comports with community standards of fairness and policy rather than
analyze a hypothetical model of the bargaining process.”
Such theories of fairness, justice and morality have increasingly become part
of the discussion on international economic law in general and international
trade law in particular.185 In the extractive industries context, issues of justice
and morality are particularly relevant. This is because these natural resources
not only offer the best hope for addressing the pressing social and other
challenges citizens of poor countries face, but also because the extraction of
resources such as oil, hard-wood timber and minerals like diamonds is highly
correlated with violence and massive abuses of human rights. Unfortunately, the
majority of citizens in resource-rich countries are at the very bottom of the
global income ladder as the illustration below demonstrates.186
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Figure 4187
Take the example of commercial timber logging—in countries as diverse
as Brazil and Cameroon, loggers undermine the rights of forest peoples to
manage and control the lands they call home and on which they rely not only
for their livelihood, but also rely on for cultural and religious purposes.
Loggers interfere with fishing, collecting, and hunting practices of forest
communities thereby threatening their subsistence and cultural survival.188
In short, mining, petroleum, logging, agribusiness, ranching, and tourism
activities under-mine the ability of local communities to depend on the only
resources they depend for their livelihoods and their cultural identity.
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available at http://www.unep.ch/etb/publications/GE%20Briefs%202012/Briefing%20paper
%20GE_POVERTY%20REDUCTION.pdf.
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That is why it is important to structure resource extraction contracts in a
way that explicitly accommodates the interests of these communities.
Recognizing third party beneficiary rights is a superior way of
accommodating the rights of affected communities than approaches that try
to hold governments and resource extraction companies liable after the fact.
Promoting accountability is vastly important, especially in low-income,
resource-rich communities where powerful private parties could otherwise
exercise their wealth, power, and access to corrupt governmental officials to
the detriment of the citizens—to illustrate, the extraction of minerals
accounts for only about 1% of African countries’ gross domestic product,
though it accounts for 70% of their total exports.189
Further, to promote the interests of justice and morality, in order to avoid
exploitation of the natural resources of developing countries is through
transparency initiatives. One initiative at the forefront of the push towards
better “global governance” is the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme
(KPCS).190 The KPCS is an “international certification scheme aimed at
preventing the world diamond trade from funding conflicts and fueling
human rights abuses.”191 The KPCS requires member countries to enact
legislation that regulates, monitors, and ensures “conflict-free” diamond
trading.192 Considering the adverse consequences to people that previously
stemmed from the diamond trade, a key feature of the KPCS is the threat of
expulsion from the KPCS that participating countries face for noncompliance, which can lead to a ban on trading with other KPCS
members.193 By extension, protecting people from violence and other human
rights violations is so important that the KPCS’s restriction on diamond trade

189
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Science, Technology and Engineering for Long-Term Growth, 51 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
664, 678 (2013) (citing Avantika Chilkoti, Africa’s Extractive Industries: Dividing the Spoils,
FIN. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2012, 8:51 AM), http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2012/10/17/africas-ext
ractive-industry-dividing-the-spoils).
190
Andrés Meijía Acosta, Impact and Effectiveness of Transparency and Accountability
Initiatives: Natural Resource Governance, INST. DEV. STUD. (Oct. 1, 2010), available at http://
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is allowed to operate by virtue of a rare waiver to the free trade rules of the
World Trade Organization policy that promotes free trade.194
Perhaps the most well known global transparency initiative is the
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).195 The EITI has
evolved into the model disclosure standard implemented by countries to
resource extraction agreements.196 The purpose behind the EITI is to allow
citizens to track government spending and revenues from the country’s
natural resources, as well as promote greater accountability for such
accounting practices.197
An example of legal action at the domestic level is the United States’
adoption of an amendment to Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act that would require disclosure of
payments by resource extraction issuers.198 The disclosure requirements in
the Act are specifically intended to complement international transparency
efforts like the EITI.199 The purpose behind the required disclosures is to
increase the transparency of payments made by resource extraction
companies to governments related to commercial development.200 The
central goal of increased transparency under the Act “is to help empower
citizens of those resource-rich countries to hold their governments
accountable for the wealth generated by those resources.”201
Furthermore, these transparency initiatives are indicative of the fact that
resource extraction and development should primarily benefit the people.202
D. Public Policy Rationales
As we saw above, rules of international law and national Constitutions
recognize and declare the interests peoples have natural resources found in
194
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26, 2003), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news03_e/goods_council_26fev03_e.htm; see
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their countries and localities. To illustrate how this public interest
recognition in natural resources is reflected in practice, this section discusses
how this principle has received judicial recognition. The example I use
invoked the Indonesian Constitution, which in the relevant part provides that
“The land, the waters and the natural resources within shall be under the
powers of the State and shall be used to the greatest benefit of the people.”203
This principle of public ownership of natural resources in Indonesia was
consequential in a United States Federal Circuit case, Karaha Bodas Co. v.
Perushaan Petrambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara.204 The issue in
this case was whether trust funds held in fifteen Bank of America accounts
from the sale of liquefied natural gas in Indonesia could be attached to satisfy
an unrelated arbitration award of $261 million that KBC won against the
government of Indonesia.205 The funds were held by an Indonesian
governmental entity, Pertamina, whose goal under Indonesian law was to “to
develop and carry out the exploitation of oil and natural gas . . . for the
maximum prosperity of the People and the State.”206
There are two ways in which Karaha Bodas is important to illustrate how
public policy is critical in resolving legal challenges relating to extractive
industry disputes. First, although KBC—the corporation in the case—only
sued Pertamina, the Indonesian agency charged with the development of
liquefied natural gas, the Second Circuit allowed Indonesia’s Ministry of
Finance to participate in the appeal although it had been a non-party in the
proceedings before the District Court.207 The Ministry became involved only
after KBC attached the trust accounts at Bank of America.208 The Second
Circuit justified its decision based on precedent, noting that
In Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 122 S. Ct. 2005, 2008,
2013 (2002), the Court held that an unnamed member of a class
could appeal a class action settlement at a fairness hearing even
though he had failed to intervene earlier. The Court cautioned
that “[t]he label ‘party’ does not indicate an absolute

203
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characteristic, but rather a conclusion about the applicability of
various procedural rules that may differ based on context.”209
Therefore, to the extent to which a non-party’s interest may be affected by
enforcing a judgment to which he or she did not participate, that non-party
would allowed to participate in proceedings related to execution or
attachment of the judgment.
Second, and equally important, the Second Circuit applied Indonesian law
to determine the ownership of the funds in the trust accounts.210 New York’s
choice of law rules dictate that the rules to determine ownership are those of
the jurisdiction with the “greater interest,” and the facts and contacts that are
significant in determining the interests of the state are those that relate to the
purpose of the law in question.211 Under this test, the Second Circuit
determined that the overwhelming weight of interests in the trust accounts
favored the application of Indonesian rather than New York law in
determining ownership of the Trust funds.212
The Second Circuit concluded that New York’s interests were
attenuated.213 According to the Court, an examination of Indonesian law
under which Pertamina was established evinced a “significant national
interest” in the fate of the trust funds.214 Determining whether or not New
York or Indonesian law was applicable was therefore critical. KBC argued
in vain that because Pertamina controlled the trust accounts, it owned all the
funds in the account, and as such they were all attachable to satisfy the
arbitral award.215 The Second Circuit was not convinced—it agreed with the
Indonesian Ministry and applied Indonesian law, holding that only 5% of the
trust accounts that Pertamina owned were attachable.216

209

Id.
Id. at 87.
211
Id. (the Indonesian interest in the funds was the maintenance of satisfactory exchange
rate reserves. Such reserves are critical for countries to be able to effectively participate in
international trade.).
212
Id.
213
Id. (according to the Second Circuit “New York statutory interests implicated here are
relatively attenuated: (i) the creation and operation of trusts under New York law; (ii) the
execution of sales contracts that operate under New York law to obtain funds for deposit in
these trusts; (iii) New York’s general interest ‘in defining and protecting the property interests
of its citizens and those who do business there,’ . . . ; and (iv) New York’s ‘interest as an
international clearinghouse and market place . . . .’ ”).
214
Id.
215
Id. at 83, 88.
216
Id. at 92.
210

132

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 43:93

The Second Circuit found that the rest of the Trust funds were held in a
constructive trust for the government of Indonesia.217 Because funds held in
trust by Pertamina belonged to another party, the Second Circuit concluded
that they were not subject to attachment under the law.218
Ultimately, this Article uses Karaha Bodas to make two points. First,
that it is important to observe how public interest analysis is embedded in
transactional disputes relating to resource extraction. Here a conflict of law
analysis allows the Indonesian ministry to appear as a non-party on appeal in
the case since it is able to show interest in the money in issue.219 This
interest was so significant that the Second Circuit held that its participation
on appeal was permissible even if it had not been a party to the case in the
district court.220 Second, the Second Circuit upheld the view embodied in
Indonesian law, that the revenue generated from extracting liquefied natural
gas was held in a constructive trust on behalf of the government and
effectively of the people of Indonesia.221 In these two respects, the Second
Circuit upheld the interests of the government of Indonesia against those of a
foreign investor. The Court declined to expand the remedies for KBC
beyond those for which KBC had negotiated.222
Further, unlike under colonial times, when resources were appropriated
through capitulation treaties, contracts today govern access to these resources
in a manner that balances the rights of investors and governments.223 Karaha
Bodas demonstrates the importance and potential of pursuing transactional,
and, in my view, contractual—approaches, to ensuring that beneficiaries of
these resources actually benefit.
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V. OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES TO THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY STANDING
IN RESOURCE CONTRACTS
Parties often enter into contracts to enhance their wealth through
exchange and to make reliable plans.224 Moving from this premise,
objections against the Third Party Beneficiary Principle are advanced
because the Principle interferes with the ability of contracting parties to
enhance their wealth and make reliable business plans.225 A similar objection
is that the Third Party Beneficiary Principle upsets the stability of the
contractual relations between promisor and promisee.226 Indeed, this
stability lies at the heart of contract law.227 According to this view,
“[c]ontract liability, unlike tort liability, is based almost entirely on a
consensual relationship,”228 and that its policy underpinnings are “more
concerned with enforcing privately made bargains than with coercing
behavior.”229
The response to these objections is that third party beneficiary status is
consistent with exchanged promises in resource extraction contracts.230 In
other words, allowing third parties to sue is necessary to effectuate the
intentions of the parties to the contract.231 Thus the ability to sue on the part
of a third party here is remedial, not substantive.232 It is remedial because the
third party seeks to enforce the contracting parties’ promises. Here, third
party standing would not necessarily depend on proving that the contracting
parties actually intended to benefit the third party, but instead depends on
effectuating the will of the parties.
In addition, the objective of benefiting the local population lies at the core
of resource extraction contracts. A government contracting with an investor
does not do so on its own behalf, but rather on behalf of its citizens. This
relationship is perhaps most apparent in contracts for public services. Yet, in
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the end, all government contracts are contracts for public services, because
the fundamental nature of government is to serve its citizens.233
The paradigm of governments contracting with investors for the benefit of
their citizens finds support in the theory of public trust.234 Under this theory,
the nation-state claims ownership over the natural resources collectively
Its government, therefore, holds and
belonging to the “people.”235
administers the property in trust and, as the “people’s” representative, owes
the people duties of loyalty, care, and good faith.236 Where the government
holds natural resources in such public trust, “there exists in every contractual
agreement between MNCs [multinational corporations] and host
governments a silent and innumerable group of parties in interest: the
‘people’ as third-party beneficiaries of all such investment contracts.”237
In further response to the stated objections, contracting parties can
employ drafting techniques to minimize the extent to which third party rights
interfere with the parties’ ability to enhance wealth and make reliable
business plans. For example, in resource extraction contracts with third
world governments, MNCs manage risk by including provisions that waive
sovereign immunity and compel arbitration. Together, such provisions could
permit MNCs to seek contribution from contracting governments when
facing lawsuits by community members.238 Business plans would, therefore,
be reliable because the financial burden of resolving litigation would
ultimately fall on the parties in proportion to their culpability under the
contracts, if any.
Another objection to adoption of the Third Party Beneficiary Principle is
that it would open the floodgates of litigation against private parties
233
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contracting with the government. This is because government contracts
benefit a large number of people and, as such, allowing third parties to sue
on those contracts would subject investors and governments to endless
litigation. Justice Cardozo objected to precisely such a possibility in H.R.
Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co.239 The dissent in Just’s, Inc. v. Arrington
Construction Co. raised similar objections.240
Another objection to the Third Party Beneficiary Principle is that, if
adopted, it could potentially impose liability greatly disproportionate to the
potential benefits that investors stand to receive under government
contracts.241 However, it is notable that the largest flows of foreign direct
investment in Africa are highest in resource-rich countries such as Angola
notwithstanding the political instability in those countries.242 In short,
despite political instability, there are great gains to be made from extractive
resources. Unsurprisingly, investors and financiers in the natural resource
extraction industry argue that they make natural resource investments not
only for their benefit, but also to benefit local populations.
Another objection is that investors will not assent to third party
beneficiary clauses when contracting with governments. The objection is
similar to the argument doubting investors’ willingness to accept contracts
that adopt the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’s
(OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.243 These Guidelines
promote responsible business conduct worldwide by making MNCs
239
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responsible to “respect and uphold human rights, workers’ rights, and
environmental sustainability within the framework of international
instruments.”244 However desirable it may be for developing countries to
incorporate the OECD Guidelines into contracts, the intense competition
among recipients for foreign investment coupled with the financial power
and influence of MNCs, render the incorporation of these guidelines unlikely
at the moment.245
Yet, objections to inclusion of contractual terms unfavorable to investors
are overstated. This is well illustrated by countries’ that have succeeded in
adding provisions to contracts against private investors’ initial objections.
To illustrate, Botswana negotiated extremely generous royalty payments that
a very powerful investor, De Beers, strongly protested.246 After lengthy
negotiations where Botswana contended that the initial contract with De
Beers was unfair, Botswana prevailed.247
Additionally, some MNCs take affirmative steps to prevent human rights
violations.248 For example, a study of fourteen Dutch MNCs found that
almost all of them required supply partners to sign codes of conduct, many of
which became binding through incorporation into supply contracts.249 These
codes of conduct included codes of social responsibility, extending to
treatment of the suppliers’ and sub-suppliers’ employees, which in many
cases established legally enforceable third-party beneficiaries.250
The Dutch are not the only investors willing to bind themselves to protect
third world citizens. Some contracts between resource extraction companies
and developing countries incorporate the World Bank’s social standards.251
For example, the Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline
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Project incorporates the World Bank’s environmental standards.252 These
examples demonstrate that the objection that investors would prohibit third
party beneficiary clauses is overstated, and that even if investors did object to
third party beneficiary clauses, their objections would not necessarily defeat
incorporation of the clause in all cases.
It is also an ill-conceived fear that incorporating third party benefits into
resource extraction contracts will deter foreign investment.253 “[N]atural
resources are available in commercial quantity in only a few countries,
meaning that there is little room for forum shopping in terms of investment
in natural resource exploitation.”254 This creates intense competition for
access to natural resources and, therefore, makes it unlikely that third party
beneficiary provisions would scare away investors.255
Further, natural resource contracts between developing countries and
foreign investors are often signed in secrecy, away from public forums such
as Parliament.256 Having third party beneficiary status would permit third
world communities to enforce natural resource contracts to benefit those
most directly affected by natural resource extraction—typically themselves.
Investor rights have generally been jealously and vigorously protected by
restrictive interpretations of contract doctrines that create little wiggle room
to deviate from such rights.257 In this context arbitrators or courts may
follow the same restrictive path by finding that for third party beneficiary
claims to stand, the parties must be shown to have explicitly intended to
create such rights.
VI. CONCLUSION
In my view, third party beneficiary rights ought to be available to third
world citizens so they can hold accountable both their governments and
investors when natural resources are exploited. Requiring privity of contract
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would ensure that citizens could not sue in contract when they are harmed.
And, requiring privity is not the most logical approach—it is impossible to
expect that citizens could be parties to a contract, and it is expected that
governments contract on behalf of their citizens. For these reasons, the Third
Party Beneficiary Principle is a vastly better alternative.
As mentioned above, natural resource contracts have a public nature.
Resource extraction contracts between a government and foreign investor
affect local citizens in profound and obvious ways. For example, citizens
might be forced to relocate, food and water sources could be polluted beyond
repair, and resources that local communities could use could become
depleted. On the other hand, the benefits could be positive. Mining,
transportation, or other jobs could be created for otherwise jobless and
destitute citizens. Regardless of the actual outcome of these contracts,
governments enter into these contracts for the benefit of local citizens.
Because citizens are the intended beneficiaries of resource contracts, it only
makes sense that they have rights in the event that any of the above harms
occur.
Adopting third party beneficiary rights will not only provide tangible
benefits to local citizens, but they will also be more-than-ideal replacements
for the currently unenforceable remedies, like contract and revenue
transparency, codes of conduct, and the U.N. Norms on Business and Human
Rights. As currently applied, none of these approaches has been adequately
enforceable, probably because they are voluntary and non-binding as a
matter of law. The Third Party Beneficiary Principle would function as an
important and necessary tool, supplementing these existing approaches. It
would potentially solve problems that currently have no clear solutions.
An important contribution of recognizing the Third Party Beneficiary
Principle is that it would set one of the background rules or one of the ground
rules against which contracts for negotiation of extractive resources would be
conducted. As a result, even if beneficiary communities were unable to
pursue remedies in court, the recognition of the Third Party Beneficiary
Principle would likely influence the negotiation of contracts by forcing the
parties to take into account the rights of local communities.
Granting third world citizens third party beneficiary rights would not
restrict investor’s rights.258 The Third Party Beneficiary Principle would not
necessarily bind investors to the law of the country and bar all international
remedies—like arbitration. Instead, it would provide third world citizens
with a mechanism with which they can enforce existing agreements and hold
258
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responsible parties accountable in the event that harms occur. The risk to
investors therefore is not a reduction of rights, but is instead the ability for
citizens to sue when harms occur.
My argument in short has been that the Third Party Beneficiary Principle
should become a background norm against which negotiations of resource
contracts take place. In this context, governmental natural resource contracts
would consider citizens as beneficiaries to the resources available in their
countries. This approach would not only account for the rights of citizens,
but would provide an avenue for redress in the event of harm to the citizens.
Though not perfect, third party beneficiary rights would provide far better
protection to citizens and would outperform any of the currently available
remedies.

